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Abstract
The black hole attack is one of the well-known security threats in wireless mobile ad
hoc networks. The intruders utilize the loophole to carry out their malicious
behaviors because the route discovery process is necessary and inevitable. Many
researchers have conducted different detection techniques to propose different types
of detection schemes. In this paper, we survey the existing solutions and discuss the
state-of-the-art routing methods. We not only classify these proposals into single
black hole attack and collaborative black hole attack but also analyze the categories
of these solutions and provide a comparison table. We expect to furnish more
researchers with a detailed work in anticipation.
Keywords: mobile ad hoc networks, routing protocols, single black hole attack, colla-
borative black hole attack
1. Introduction
Wireless mobile ad hoc network (or simply MANET throughout this paper) is a self-
configuring network which is composed of several movable user equipment. These
mobile nodes communicate with each other without any infrastructure, furthermore,
all of the transmission links are established through wireless medium. According to
the communication mode mentioned before. MANET is widely used in military pur-
pose, disaster area, personal area network and so on [1]. However, there are still many
open issues about MANETs, such as security problem, finite transmission bandwidth
[2], abusive broadcasting messages [3], reliable data delivery [4], dynamic link establish-
ment [5] and restricted hardware caused processing capabilities [6].
The security threats have been extensively discussed and investigated in the wired
and wireless networks [7], the correspondingly perplexing situation has also happened
in MANET due to the inherent design defects [8]. There are many security issues
which have been studied in recent years. For instance, snooping attacks, wormhole
attacks, black hole attacks [9], routing table overflow and poisoning attacks, packet
replication, denial of service (DoS) attacks, distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks, et cetera
[10]. Especially, the misbehavior routing problem [11] is one of the popularized secur-
ity threats such as black hole attacks. Some researchers propose their secure routing
idea [12-15] to solve this issue, but the security problem is still unable to prevent
completely.
In this paper, we focus on different types of black hole attacks in MANET which can
be divided into ordinary black hole attack and collaborative black hole attack.
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Moreover, several detection schemes are discussed clearly and comparably. The evalua-
tion metrics of routing protocol include packet delivery ratio (PDR), mobility variation
with total number of errors, packet routing overhead, end-to-end delay by varying in
node density [16].
In the following, we first introduce different kinds of routing protocols in Sec. 2,
which includes proactive routing, reactive routing and hybrid routing protocols. In Sec.
3 and Sec. 4, we respectively classify the black hole attacks from their malicious oper-
ating actions into black hole attacks and collaborative black hole attacks, and also ana-
tomize the misbehavior to provide the comparisons between related literatures in both
sections. Finally, we conclude this survey in Sec. 5.
2. Background
There are plenty and different routing protocols in MANET and kinds of investigations
have been completed in recent decades [17,18]. In this section, we introduce the
famous and popular routing protocols in MANET. Before a mobile node wants to
communicate with a target node, it should broadcast its present status to the neighbors
due to the current routing information is unfamiliar. According to how the informa-
tion is acquired, the routing protocols can be classified into proactive, reactive and
hybrid routing.
2.1. Proactive (table-driven) Routing Protocol
The proactive routing is also called table-driven routing protocol. In this routing pro-
tocol, mobile nodes periodically broadcast their routing information to the neighbors.
Each node needs to maintain their routing table which not only records the adjacent
nodes and reachable nodes but also the number of hops. In other words, all of the
nodes have to evaluate their neighborhoods as long as the network topology has chan-
ged. Therefore, the disadvantage is that the overhead rises as the network size
increases, a significant communication overhead within a larger network topology.
However, the advantage is that network status can be immediately reflected if the mali-
cious attacker joins. The most familiar types of the proactive type are destination
sequenced distance vector (DSDV) [19] routing protocol and optimized link state rout-
ing (OLSR) [20] protocol.
2.2. Reactive (on-demand) Routing Protocol
The reactive routing is equipped with another appellation named on-demand routing
protocol. Unlike the proactive routing, the reactive routing is simply started when
nodes desire to transmit data packets. The strength is that the wasted bandwidth
induced from the cyclically broadcast can be reduced. Nevertheless, this might also be
the fatal wound when there are any malicious nodes in the network environment. The
weakness is that passive routing method leads to some packet loss. Here we briefly
describe two prevalent on-demand routing protocols which are ad hoc on-demand dis-
tance vector (AODV) [21] and dynamic source routing (DSR) [22] protocol.
AODV is constructed based on DSDV routing. In AODV, each node only records
the next hop information in its routing table but maintains it for sustaining a routing
path from source to destination node. If the destination node can’t be reached from
the source node, the route discovery process will be executed immediately. In the
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route discovery phase, the source node broadcasts the route request (RREQ) packet
first. Then all intermediate nodes receive the RREQ packets, but parts of them send
the route reply (RREP) packet to the source node if the destination node information
is occurred in their routing table. On the other hand, the route maintenance process is
started when the network topology has changed or the connection has failed. The
source node is informed by a route error (RRER) packet first. Then it utilizes the pre-
sent routing information to decide a new routing path or restart the route discovery
process for updating the information in routing table.
The design idea of DSR is based on source routing. The source routing means that
each data packet contains the routing path from source to destination in their headers.
Unlike the AODV which only records the next hop information in the routing table,
the mobile nodes in DSR maintain their route cache from source to destination node.
In terms of the above discussion, the routing path can be determined by source node
because the routing information is recorded in the route cache at each node. However,
the performance of DSR decreases with the mobility of network increases, a lower
packet delivery ratio within the higher network mobility.
2.3. Hybrid Routing Protocol
The hybrid routing protocol combines the advantages of proactive routing and reactive
routing to overcome the defects of them. Most of hybrid routing protocols are
designed as a hierarchical or layered network framework. In the beginning, proactive
routing is employed to completely gather the unfamiliar routing information, then
using the reactive routing to maintain the routing information when network topology
changes. The familiar hybrid routing protocols are zone routing protocol (ZRP) [23]
and temporally-ordered routing algorithm (TORA) [24].
3. Single Black Hole Attack
A black hole problem means that one malicious node utilizes the routing protocol to
claim itself of being the shortest path to the destination node, but drops the routing pack-
ets but does not forward packets to its neighbors. A single black hole attack is easily hap-
pened in the mobile ad hoc networks [25]. An example is shown as Figure 1, node 1
stands for the source node and node 4 represents the destination node. Node 3 is a misbe-
havior node who replies the RREQ packet sent from source node, and makes a false
response that it has the quickest route to the destination node. Therefore node 1 erro-
neously judges the route discovery process with completion, and starts to send data pack-
ets to node 3. As what mentioned above, a malicious node probably drops or consumes
the packets. This suspicious node can be regarded as a black hole problem in MANETs.
As a result, node 3 is able to misroute the packets easily, and the network operation is suf-
fered from this problem. The most critical influence is that the PDR diminished severely.
In the following, different detection schemes for single black hole attack are pre-
sented in a chronological order. The comparisons of different schemes are shown in
Table 1.
3.1. Neighborhood-based and Routing Recovery Scheme [26]
Bo Sun et al. use AODV as their routing example, and claim that the on-demand rout-
ing protocols such as DSR are also suitably applied after a slightly modified. The
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detection scheme uses on a neighborhood-based method to recognize the black hole
attack, and a routing recovery protocol to build the correct path. The neighborhood-
based method is employed to identify the unconfirmed nodes, and the source node
sends a Modify_Route_Entry control packet to destination node to renew routing path
in the recovery protocol.
In this scheme, not only a lower detection time and higher throughput are acquired,
but the accurate detection probability is also achieved. To deserve to be mentioned,
the routing control overhead does not increase in Bo Sun et al.’s proposal. However,
this scheme is useless when the attackers cooperate to forge the fake reply packets.
3.2. Redundant Route Method and Unique Sequence Number Scheme [27]
Mohammad Al-Shurman et al. propose two solutions to avoid the black hole attacks in
MANET. The first solution is to find more than one route from the source node to the
destination node. In other words, there exist some redundant routes within the routing
path, and authors assume there are three routes at least in the scenario. The working
flow of redundant route mechanism is described briefly as below. First, the source
node sends a ping packet, a RREQ packet, to the destination. The receiver who has a
route to the destination will reply this request, and a acknowledge examination is exe-
cuted at source node. Then the sender will buffer the RREP packet until there are
more than two received RREP packets, and transmit the buffered packets after identify-
ing a safe route. It represents that there are at lowest two routing paths coexisting at
Figure 1 The single black hole problem. Figure 1 is an example of single black hole attack in the
mobile ad hoc networks [25]. Node 1 stands for the source node and node 4 represents the destination
node. Node 3 is a misbehavior node who replies the RREQ packet sent from source node, and makes a
false response that it has the quickest route to the destination node. Therefore node 1 erroneously judges
the route discovery process with completion, and starts to send data packets to node 3. In the mobile ad
hoc networks, a malicious node probably drops or consumes the packets. This suspicious node can be
regarded as a black hole problem in MANETs. As a result, node 3 is able to misroute the packets easily,
and the network operation is suffered from this problem.
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the same time. After that, the source node recognizes the safe route from the number
of hops or nodes, and prevents the black hole attacks.
In the second solution, an idea of unique sequence number is mentioned. The
sequence value is accumulated; hence it’s ever higher than the current sequence
number. In this solution, two values are needed to be recorded in two additional
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tables. One is the last-packet-sequence-numbers for the last packet sent to every
node and the other is for the last packet received. When any packet are trans-
mitted or received, these two tables will be updated automatically. According to
these two table values, the sender node can identify whether there is malicious
nodes or not.
In the simulation results, these two solutions have less RREQ and RREP numbers
than AODV. Furthermore, solution two is better than solution one due to the
sequence number included in every packet in the original routing protocol. The com-
munication overhead can be eliminated by this solution because of the inbound crypto-
graphy method. Nevertheless, the cooperative black hole attacks can’t be detected in
both proposed solutions. The redundant route and unique sequence number can be
easily broke by two collaborative black hole nodes.
3.3. Time-based Threshold Detection Scheme [28]
Latha Tamilselvan et al. propose a solution based on an enhancement of the original
AODV routing protocol. The major design concept is setting timer in the RimerExpir-
edTable for collecting the other request from other nodes after receiving the first
request. It will store the packet’s sequence number and the received time in a Collect
Route Reply Table (CRRT), counting the timeout value based on the arriving time of
the first route request, judging the route belong to valid or not based on the above
threshold value. The simulation using global mobile simulator (GloMoSim) shows that
a higher packet delivery ratio is obtained with only minimal delay and overhead. But
the end-to-end delay might be raised visibly when the suspicious node is away from
the source node.
3.4. Random Two-hop ACK and Bayesian Detection Scheme [29]
Djamel Djenouri et al. propose a solution to monitor, detect, and isolate the black hole
attack in MANETs. In the monitor phase, an efficient technique of random two-hop
ACK is employed. The simulation result shows that random two-hop ACK hugely
reduces the cost with a higher true and lower false detection than ordinary two-hop
ACK scheme. A local judgment approach based on Bayesian technique is penetrated in
the detection phase. The proposed Bayesian detection method does not use any peri-
odic packets exchanging, therefore the familiar overhead problem can be eliminated
from this solution. And after a mobile node is determined that it is a misbehavior
node by the proposed detection scheme, this judgment must be proved by all nodes.
Hence, authors propose a witness-based protocol that forces the recognized node to
ensure this decision from other nodes. Before isolating the misbehavior node at the
same time, the witness-based protocol enforces the detector to gather k witnesses at
least. However, the decision of k value is a trade-off problem. A higher k value elimi-
nates the false detection and attack probability, but reduces the detection efficiency,
and vice versa.
The simulation shows that the proposed solution can achieve a lower false detection
rate and higher true detection rate than watchdog (WD) approach. The solution uti-
lizes cooperatively witness-based verification, nevertheless, it’s difficult to prevent colla-
borate black hole attack for the judgment phase is only running on local side. It might
be failed if some malicious nodes deceive the detection node cooperatively.
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3.5. Resource-Efficient ACcounTability (REAct) Scheme based on Random Audits [30]
William Kozma Jr. et al. propose a reactive misbehavior detection scheme called REAct
scheme. When the performance is descended between source and destination node, the
REAct is triggered automatically. REAct constitutes of three phases: (a) the audit phase,
(b) the search phase and (c) the identification phase. To simply describe the REAct
scheme, the target node sends a feedback to the sender when a biggish packet drop
ratio is recognized. Then the source node chooses an audit node, and utilizes the
bloom filter to produce a behavioral proof. Finally, the segment location of malicious
node can be distinguished from comparing the source node’s behavioral proof.
The simulation shows that REAct scheme not only reduces the communication over-
head, but enlarges the identification delay because REAct is based on reactive DSR
routing protocol. Furthermore, there are some critical weaknesses in REAct. First, the
REAct is designed for non-cooperative black hole attack only. It’s unsuccessful in the
collaborative black hole scenario because other malicious node is able to manipulate a
fake proof and send to the audit node. Second, the behavioral proof only records the
information of transmission packets rather than the nodes. It fails to verify who the
producer of the behavioral proof is. Finally, using the binary search method to find the
attacker is easily expose audit node’s information. The attacker is able to cheat source
node by changing its behavior dynamically.
3.6. Detection, Prevention and Reactive AODV (DPRAODV) Scheme [31]
A new control packet called ALARM is used in DPRAODV, while other main concepts
are the dynamic threshold value. Unlike normal AODV, the RREP_seq_no is extra
checked whether higher than the threshold value or not. If the value of RREP_seq_no
is higher than the threshold value, the sender is regarded as an attacker and updated it
to the black list. The ALARM is sent to its neighbors which includes the black list,
thus the RREP from the malicious node is blocked but is not processed. On the other
hand, the dynamic threshold value is changed by calculating the average of dest_seq_no
between the sequence number and RREP packet in each time slot. According to this
scheme, the black hole attacks not only be detected but also prevented by updating
threshold which responses the realistic network environment.
In the simulation results, the packet delivery ratio is improved by 80-85% than
AODV when under black hole attack, and 60% when traffic load increases. The advan-
tage of DPRAODV is that it achieves an obviously higher packet delivery ratio than
the original AODV, except for it takes a little bit higher routing overhead and end-to-
end delay. But DPRAODV simply detects multiple black holes rather than cooperative
black hole attack.
3.7. Next Hop Information Scheme [32]
N. Jaisankar et al. propose a security approach which is composed of two parts, detec-
tion and reaction. In the first part, the field_next_hop is added to the RREP packet.
Before source node sends the data packets, the leading RREP packet is examined
between intermediate node and destination node. Each node maintains a black identifi-
cation table (BIT), and the fields in this table are <source, target, current_node_ID,
Packet_received_count (PRC), Packet_forwarded_count (PFC), Packet modified count
(PMC)>. Then the PMC is updated by tracing the BIT from their neighborhoods. If
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the node acts correctly, the corresponding count value multiplies. After that, a mali-
cious node can be found out if the number of receiving packets differentiates from
sending packets. The second part is isolating the black hole, thus each node maintains
an isolation table (IT) and stores the black node ID. The ID is broadcasted to all
nodes in order to eliminate the malicious node by checking the isolation table.
In the simulation result, the packet delivery ratio is improved by 40-50% than AODV
when facing attacks, and the number of packets dropped is decreased by 75-80%.
Unlike the conventional next hop method, this solution modifies the original RREP
packets to collect the information of malicious nodes rather than sending further pack-
ets. The proposed solution provides a higher packet delivery ratio and lower packet
loss rate than conventional with little additional delay.
3.8. Nital Mistry et al.’s Method [33]
Nital Mistry et al. add a new table Cmg_RREP_Tab, a new timer MOS_WAIT_TIME
and a variable Mali_node to the original AODV routing protocol. The proposed solu-
tion is basically modifies an additional function Pre_ReceiveReply viz Packet P.
The definitions of innovative functions are clarified first. The RREP_WAIT_TIME is a
time period during the source node sends first RREP packet until receive the RREP
control messages. And the MOS_WAIT_TIME is half the value of RREP_WAIT_TIME.
The RREP packets are stored in the newly built table viz. Cmg_RREP_Tab. Lastly the
Mail_node is utilized to record the malicious nodes in order to discard the control
message from these nodes.
After introducing the proposed functions, the approach will be briefly described as
below. In the first step, the additional function viz. Pre_ReceiveReply is executed. The
source node analyzes all the RREP packets stored in the Cmg_RREP_Tab table. Then
the RREP packet is abandoned which has a higher destination sequence number than
the source sequence number, and the sender is suspected to be a malicious node. As
long as the attacker is identified, the control message coming from it can be ignored.
Thus, the RREP packet with the highest destination sequence number is chosen in
Cmg_RREP_Tab table. The Mali_node is maintained continually, and at final the Recei-
veReply in default AODV is called.
The PDR is improved by 81.811% when the network size varying, while it will rise
70.877% when the node’s mobility varying. Comparing with original AODV routing
protocol, this solution achieves a higher packet delivery ratio in the simulation results.
However, the end-to-end delay is increased unavoidably. The end-to-end delay is rising
13.28% when network size adjusting, and rising 6.28% when mobility adjusting.
Furthermore, this approach is also failed to discuss the collaborative black hole attack
problem.
3.9. Intrusion Detection System based on Anti-black hole mechanism [34]
Since there is no centralized infrastructure device in MANET and no difficulty to over-
come the inborn characteristics, it’s challenged to develop an intrusion detection sys-
tem (IDS). Ming-Yang Su proposes an IDS scheme to solve the selective black hole
attacks in MANET, and plants an anti-black hole mechanism (ABM) in all IDS nodes.
The ABM employs two additional tables called RQ table and SN table as shown in
Table 2 and Table 3. The RQ table records the RREQ message within IDS node’s
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transmission range. The contents including the source and destination ID, source
sequence number, maximum hop count value, broadcasting node ID and expiration
time. The IDS nodes use SN table to estimate the suspicious values nodes within its
transmission range. The components of SN table including the node ID, suspicious
values and status. If an intermediate node never broadcasts a RREQ for a route but
sends a RREP packet, the suspicious value will be added one in the neighbor IDS
node’s SN table. Apart from this, another new Block table is added into the original
routing table in order to record the list of black holes. The Block table is shown as
Table 4.
The basic framework of proposed IDS is introduced as follow. In the beginning, the
IDS nodes execute the ABM function in a sniff mode. According to the irregular dif-
ference between the routing information transmitted from a dubious node, a value of
the suspicious node can be estimated by ABM. If the value exceeds the predefined
threshold value, it can be regarded as a black hole. When a normal node receives a
Block message broadcasted by the IDS node, this node adds the malicious node which
stored in the Block message into the Block table. After that, the normal node forwards
RREP packet to establish the routing. If the RREP packet is acquired from its neighbor
node which noted in the Block table, the normal node drops this RREP packet to pre-
vent the malicious attack.
The proposed IDS scheme simulated under the existing one and two black holes net-
work environment. The packet loss rate for AODV are 92.40% (one black hole) and
97.32% (two black hole), and 10.05% (threshold as 5) to 13.04% (threshold as 10) for
IDS system with 9 IDS nodes. However, how to decide the threshold value does not be
explained clearly in this paper.
4. Collaborative Black Hole Attack
There are various mechanisms have been proposed for solving single black hole attack
in recent years. However, many detection schemes are failed in discussing the coopera-
tive black hole problems. Some malicious nodes collaborate together in order to
beguile the normal into their fabricated routing information, moreover, hide from the
existing detection scheme. As a result, several cooperative detection schemes are pro-
posed preventing the collaborative black hole attacks [35].
In the following, different detection schemes for the cooperative black hole attack are
presented in a chronological order. The comparison of different schemes is shown in
the Table 5.
Table 2 RQ table
Route Maximal hop count Broadcasting nodes Expiration time
Source Destination Src_seq
1 5 3001 2 2, 4, 5 02:41:12
3 2 5012 4 1, 6 02:44:34
Table 3 SN table
Node ID Suspicious value Status
3 1 Inactive
4 6 Active
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4.1. DRI Table and Cross Checking Scheme [36,37]
Sanjay Ramaswamy et al. exploit data routing information (DRI) table and cross check-
ing method to identify the cooperative black hole nodes, and utilize modified AODV
routing protocol to achieve this methodology.
Every node needs to maintain an extra DRI table, 1 represents for true and 0 for
false. The entry is composed of two bits, “From” and “Through” which stands for
information on routing data packet from the node and through the node respectively.
As shown in Table 6, the entry 1 1 implies that node 1 has successfully routed data
packets from or through node 5, and the entry of 0 0 means that node 1 has not rou-
ted any data packets from or through node 3.
The procedure of proposed solution is simply described as below. The source node
(SN) sends RREQ to each node, and sends packets to the node which replies the RREP
packet. The intermediate node (IN) transmits next hop node (NHN) and DRI table to
the SN, then the SN cross checks its own table and the received DRI table to deter-
mine the IN’s honesty. After that, SN sends the further request to IN’s NHN for asking
its routing information, including the current NHN, the NHN’s DRI table and its own
DRI table. Finally, the SN compares the above information by cross checking to judge
the malicious nodes in the routing path.
Authors propose a detection method to overcome the multiple black hole problems
and the collaborative attacks, and submit the simulation result in [37]. The experiment
result shows that this solution performs an almost 50% better than other solutions.
Table 4 Block table
IDS node Malicious node Time
IDS_A 1 2009/02/19 12:51
IDS_C 6 2009/02/19 12:55
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However, it wastes 5 to 8% communication overhead, and slightly increases the packet
loss percentage because of the secure route discovery delay.
4.2. Distributed Cooperative Mechanism (DCM) [38]
Chang Wu Yu et al. propose a distributed and cooperative mechanism viz. DCM to
solve the collaborative black hole attacks. Because the nodes works cooperatively, they
can analyze, detect, mitigate multiple black hole attacks. The DCM is composed of
four sub-modules which shown as Figure 2.
In the local data collection phase, an estimation table is constructed and maintained
by each node in the network. Each node evaluates the information of overhearing
packets to determine whether there is any malicious node. If there is one suspicious
node, the detect node initiates the local detection phase to recognize whether there is
possible black hole. The initial detection node sends a check packet to ask the coop-
erative node. If the inspection value is positive, the questionable node is regarded as a
normal node. Otherwise the initial detection node starts the cooperative detection pro-
cedure, and deals with broadcasting and notifying all one-hop neighbors to participate
in the decision making. Because the notify mode utilizes broadcasting method, the net-
work traffic is increased. A constrained broadcasting algorithm is used to restrict the
notification range within a fixed hop count. A threshold viz. thr represents the maxi-
mum hop count range of cooperative detection message. Finally, the global reaction
phase is executed to set up a notification system, and sends warning messages to the
whole network. There are reaction modes in global reaction phase. Though the first
reaction mode notifies all nodes in the network, but might waste lots of communica-
tion overhead. Each node only concerns its own black hole list and arranges its trans-
mission route in other mode, however it might be exploited by malicious nodes and
needs more operation time.
In the simulation results, the notification delivery ratio is from 64.12 (thr as 1) to
92.93% (thr as 3) when using different threshold values. Compare with the popular
Table 6 An additional table example of node 1




Figure 2 Working produces [38]. Figure 2 is working produces and the four sub-modules of Distributed
Cooperative Mechanism (DCM). In the local data collection phase, an estimation table is constructed and
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the local detection phase to recognize whether there is possible black hole. The initial detection node
sends a check packet to ask the cooperative node. If the inspection value is positive, the questionable
node is regarded as a normal node. Otherwise the initial detection node starts the cooperative detection
procedure, and deals with broadcasting and notifying all one-hop neighbors to participate in the decision
making. Finally, the global reaction phase is executed to set up a notification system, and sends warning
messages to the whole network.
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AODV routing protocol in MANET, the simulation result shows that DCM has a
higher data delivery ratio and detection rate even if there are various black hole nodes.
Even though the control overhead can be reduced due to the distributed design
method, DCM wastes few overhead inevitably.
4.3. Hash based Scheme [39]
Weichao Wang et al. design a hash based defending method to generate node beha-
vioral proofs which involve the data traffic information within the routing path. The
developing mechanism is based on auditing technique for preventing collaborative
packet drop attacks, such as collaborative black hole and grey hole problems. The pro-
posed solution is originated from an audit-based detection method videlicet REAct
[30], which is also discussed in the subsection 0 in this survey.
The vulnerability of REAct system is that cooperative adversaries can specialize in
attacker identification phase by sharing Bloom filters of packets between them. The
major difference between these two schemes is discussed as follows. A hash based
node behavioral proofs is proposed to defend the collaborative attacks. The audited
node ni is needed and settled by the source node S, and then S sends the sequence
numbers of selected packets to auditing node. After source node sends out these pack-
ets, an additional random number t0 is attached to the tail of every packet. The inter-
mediate node n1 combines the received packet and its own random number r1 to
calculate its value t1, and this operation is continued within every intermediate node
until ni receives the packet. Nevertheless, this paper doesn’t give the results, so that it’s
hard to figure out the enhancement.
4.4. Hashed-based MAC and Hash-based PRF Scheme[40]
Zhao Min and Zhou Jiliu propose two hash-based authentication mechanisms, the
message authentication code (MAC) and the pseudo random function (PRF). These
two proposals are submitted to provide fast message verification and group identifica-
tion, find the collaborative suspicious hole nodes and discover the secure routing path
to prevent cooperative black hole attacks.
The public key infrastructure (PKI) is difficult to utilize in MANET due to the inher-
ently design disadvantages, which is no centralized infrastructure. To deserve to be
mentioned, authors overcome this bottleneck and design an authentication mechanism.
The key point of this solution is that each node acquires a secret key Ki, and Ki = Gk
(ri). The sharing key Ki is undisclosed to all other nodes, hence, it is formulated by
choosing a random number ri and repeatedly applying PRF on ri by k times. When
source node receives a packet, it checks Ki-d to find whether the key used for the
MAC is disclosed or not, and checks the MAC when Ki is disclosed. After checking
the above two conditions, this packet is regarded as available packet and the route is
confirmed as a secure route. On the other hand, authors propose the other solution
based on time stamp method and global symmetric cryptosystem. However, we don’t
discuss this solution due to the time stamp method is well-known, and the global sym-
metric cryptosystem is designed based on accompanying the time delay range.
The simulation result shows that both solutions have better data delivery ratio than
AODV routing protocol. But, the detection time increases as the pause time raises,
and the control overhead of both solutions is higher than the ordinary AODV.
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Moreover, the malicious node is able to forge the false reply packets and try to avoid
the detection mechanism.
4.5. Backbone Nodes (BBN) and Restricted IP (RIP) Scheme [41]
Vishnu K. and Amos J. Paul address a mechanism to detect and remove the black and
gray hole attack. This solution is able to find the collaborative malicious nodes which
introduce massive packet drop percentage. An idea of the group of backbone nodes
used in MANET was originated from [42]. Vishnu K. et al. refer this method to pene-
trate their system model, and also add a novel scheme videlicet restricted IP (RIP) to
avoid collaborative black and gray attacks.
The detailed procedure is characterized as the following. In this solution initially a back-
bone network is established which constructed from a set of strong backbone nodes (BBNs)
over the ad hoc network. These trusted nodes can be allowed to allocate the RIP when
there is new arrival node joining. A node acquires a RIP which means that it is provided
with the routing authority. The source node requests the nearest BBN to allot a RIP before
transmitting data packets, then sending RREQ to the destination node and the address of
RIP. If the source node only receives the destination node’s RREP, it means that there is no
black hole. In the case when the source obtains the RREP packet from RIP, it implies that
adversary might be existed in the network. The RIP’s neighbor nodes change to promiscu-
ous mode as a result of the source node sends monitor messages to alert them. These
neighborhoods not only monitor the packets of designate nodes but also the suspicious
nodes. Furthermore, the source node sends few dummy data packets to test the malicious
node. The neighbor nodes monitor the data packet flow and regard it as a black hole if the
packet loss rate exceeds the normal threshold, and notify the source node that it is a mali-
cious attacker. Then the neighbor nodes broadcast this alert message through the whole
network, and add the malicious nodes to the black hole list. Finally, the attacker’s authoriza-
tion will be deleted and all of nodes drop the response from nodes in the black list.
The proposed solution not only detects black hole but also gray hole attacks, since
its methodology does not utilize the trust-based method. However, it’s hard to realize
that how is the enhanced performance because there is no any simulation result or
experiment outcome. Moreover, the proposed system might be crashed if the numbers
of attackers are higher than the numbers of normal nodes.
4.6. Bait DSR (BDSR) based on Hybrid Routing Scheme [43]
Po-Chun Tsou et al. design a novel solution named Bait DSR (BDSR) scheme to pre-
vent the collaborative black hole attacks. The proposed mechanism is composed of
proactive and reactive method to form a hybrid routing protocol, and the major
essence is the DSR on-demand routing. This solution is briefly introduced as below.
In the beginning of routing stage, the source node sends bait RREQ packet before
starting route discovery. The target address of bait RREQ is random and non-existent.
To avoid the bait RREQ inducing the traffic jam problem, BDSR use the same method
with DSR. That is all bait RREQ packets only survive for a period time. The malicious
nodes are easily expelled from the initial phase, because the bait RREQ is able to
attract the forged RREP from black hole node. In authors’ mechanism, the generator of
RREP is recorded in the RREP’s additional field. Therefore the source node can recog-
nize the location of attacker from the reply location of RREP. All of the response sent
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by the adversaries should be drop. After the initial phase, authors employ the original
DSR route discovery procedure. If the data delivery rate is lower than the pre-defined
threshold value, the bait procedure will be triggered again to examine the uncertainly
suspicious nodes.
Compare with the primitive DSR scheme and watch dog method, the simulation
results show that BDSR provides an excellent packet delivery rate. The packet delivery
ratio of BDSR is 90% which is more superior to DSR and WD approach. Moreover,
the communication overhead is also lower than watch dog scheme but slightly higher
than original DSR routing protocol.
5. Conclusions and Future Works
Due to the inherent design disadvantages of routing protocol in MANETs, many
researchers have conducted diverse techniques to propose different types of prevention
mechanisms for black hole problem. In this paper, we first summary the pros and cons
with popular routing protocol in wireless mobile ad hoc networks. Then, the state-of-
the-art routing methods of existing solutions are categorized and discussed. The pro-
posals are presented in a chronological order and divided into single black hole and
collaborative black hole attack.
According to this work, we observe that both of proactive routing and reactive rout-
ing have specialized skills. The proactive detection method has the better packet deliv-
ery ratio and correct detection probability, but suffered from the higher routing
overhead due to the periodically broadcast packets. The reactive detection method
eliminates the routing overhead problem from the event-driven way, but suffered from
some packet loss in the beginning of routing procedure. Therefore, we recommend
that a hybrid detection method which combined the advantages of proactive routing
with reactive routing is the tendency to future research direction. However, we also
discover that the attacker’s misbehavior action is the key factor. The attackers are able
to avoid the detection mechanism, no matter what kinds of routing detection used.
Accordingly, some key encryption methods or hash-based methods are exploited to
solve this problem. The black hole problem is still an active research area. This paper
will benefit more researchers to realize the current status rapidly.
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